Koselleck en su escrito Futuro Pasado, considera que la historia conceptual permite la comprensión del pensamiento socio-político ya que los conceptos son las herramientas con las que los actores de un momento histórico articularon sus estructuras socio-políticas, y proyectaron diversas expectativas sobre su futuro. Por otra parte, la implementación de la historia conceptual en el estudio del pensamiento socio-político latinoamericano, ofrece a la historia social y a la filosofía política una nueva mirada sobre la consolidación, el cambio o desaparición de (...) las sociedades, sus instituciones y sus conceptos políticos fundamentales. Ahora bien, en este escrito presento una aproximación sobre la libertad y su importancia como concepto fundamental del pensamiento socio-político, en el periodo de la Regeneración, en tres momentos. Primero, describo los lineamientos generales de la historia conceptual. Segundo, expongo la influencia de la historia conceptual en el estudio del pensamiento socio-político latinoamericano. Finalmente, establezco las posibilidades del análisis del concepto libertad durante el periodo de la Regeneración. (shrink)

En el presente escrito plantearé cómo la posibilidad de un escenario de posconflicto en Colombia se puede construir a través de una redefinición de lo político desde un planteamiento de lo común como un modo de política inclusiva que permita construir la relación nosotros/ellos en torno a intereses o valores de los individuos que conforman un grupo con afinidades, intereses disímiles y pasiones antagónicas que pueden ser resueltas en un campo agonístico. Dicho planteamiento lo abordaré en cuatro momentos. El primero, (...) expone el concepto de comunidad de Schmitt. El segundo, deconstruye el concepto schmittiano de lo político. El tercer momento presenta la concepción de lo común como el resultado de las relaciones de multiversos políticos. Finalmente, se reflexiona sobre la construcción de un escenario de posconflicto en Colombia, concebido como la relación de multiversos políticos. Palabras clave: político, conficto, agonístico, multicultural, común. (shrink)

Este escrito presenta un acercamiento a la concepción de la filosofía como terapia en Nietzsche a partir de tres momentos. En el primer momento, se establece un marco de referencia para contextualizar el interés de Nietzsche por Epicuro y justificar la posibilidad de la filosofía como terapia, desde su concepción sobre la historiografía. En el segundo momento, se propone una relación entre la terapia y los juicios mediante la interpretación que hace Nietzsche sobre la filosofía de Epicuro como dos modos (...) de consuelo. En el último momento, se presentan ciertas correspondencias entre Nietzsche y Epicuro acerca del temor a la muerte, a través del refinado heroísmo. La finalidad de estos tres momentos es considerar la posibilidad de interpretar la concepción de la filosofía de Nietzsche como una terapia que consiste en una anulación y revaloración de los juicios asumidos como verdades únicas que traen perturbación y sufrimiento. (shrink)

El presente trabajo analiza el libro Santa María del Circo (1998) de David Toscana para establecer la relación entre el espacio y la inversión o indecibilidad de papeles, jerarquías y roles sexuales. Santa María del Circo puede considerarse un entre-lugar de acuerdo con Olalla Castro o un intersticio o un lugar liminal en consonancia con Homi K. Bhabha. Este no-espacio se convierte en un territorio donde se transgrede lo que Roland Barthes llamó sentido común y permite la expansión de los (...) bordes de la cultura. Identificaremos las estrategias de inversión, banalización y trivialización que rompen con los bordes de la cultura o el sentido común, pues lo que ajusta y especifica las conductas sociales se trastoca al grado de invertirse o entrar en contradicción para generar una sociedad dinámica que expande los bordes y acepta nuevas visiones del mundo. (shrink)

Consideramos que uno de los principios basales de las democracias representativas, es el que determina “Una persona, un voto”, debe ser reformulado, debido a que mediante el mismo hemos edificado un sistema socio-político, que estableció, precisamente lo contrario, tanto en términos teóricos como prácticos, de lo que se ufana como definición y que por ende se propuso como finalidad. La frase fetiche que pretendemos erradicar, podríamos circunscribirla en una falacia de “finalidad”, es decir plantea un estado de situación potencial, ideal, (...) de posibilidad hacia; de ninguna manera, puede ser considerado un principio respetable, legítimo o hasta formalmente correcto. El planteo que trazamos parte de la realidad de que todos, no sólo somos, sino que significamos, o poseemos un valor distinto para ese estado que nos promete aquello imposible, incumplible y utópico. La variable determinante es la presencia que el estado ha tenido o no, en el desarrollo de las vidas de los ciudadanos aptos para votar. Utilizaremos el límite de la consideración de pobreza, de acuerdo a las estipulaciones de organismos internacionales, que será el báculo para sostener porque el concepto de compensación se torna central, sí es que pretendemos una democracia que se precie de ser representativa de la voluntad del pueblo. Dentro del contexto o insertos en lo que se da en llamar “filosofía latinoamericana”, que sostiene como uno de sus principios la opción del pobre, creemos que el voto de estos tiene un valor diferente, de cinco, a diferencia de los que no están en tal situación. (shrink)

_Dialectic and Dialogue_ seeks to define the method and the aims of Plato's dialectic in both the "inconclusive" dialogues and the dialogues that describe and practice a method of hypothesis. Departing from most treatments of Plato, Gonzalez argues that the philosophical knowledge at which dialectic aims is nonpropositional, practical, and reflexive. The result is a reassessment of how Plato understood the nature of philosophy.

This paper defends a ‘perspectivist’ reading of Plato’s dialogues. According to this reading, each dialogue presents a particular and limited perspective on the truth, conditioned by the specific context, aim and characters, where this perspective, not claiming to represent the whole truth on a topic, is not incompatible with the possibly very different perspectives found in other dialogues nor, on the other hand, can be subordinated or assimilated to one of these other perspectives. This model is contrasted to the other (...) models that have been proposed, i.e., Unitarianism, Developmentalism, and ‘Prolepticism’, and is shown to address and overcome the limitations of each. One major advantage of ‘perspectivism’ against the other interpretative models is that, unlike them, it can do full justice to the literary and dramatic character of the dialogues without falling into the opposite extreme of turning them into literary games with no positive philosophical content. To say that Plato’s dialogues are ‘perspectivist’ is not to say that they contain no ‘doctrines’ on the soul, for example, but, on the contrary, to stress the plurality of doctrines, with the observation that each is true within the limits of the argumentative function it is introduced to serve and of the specific dialogical context. (shrink)

El fracaso político de la Revolución francesa deja un regusto amargo de que el problema del ser humano se encuentra en la Modernidad y, concretamente, en la escisión radical que abre la conciencia. Los ideales del Bien y la Verdad son señaladas como formas muertas, carentes de potencia erótica, inservibles para movilizar al ser y, por tanto, anacrónicos para una época que quiere despertar bajo el signo de la Belleza. Un joven Schelling escribe bajo este sol naciente una obra en (...) la que el arte aparece como una praxis capaz de suturar aquella herida que abre la conciencia. La imaginación y la síntesis poética son elementos ineludibles en el transitar por una vida humana que busca su plenitud en el retorno a la unidad originaria con lo Absoluto. El gesto del genio artístico será el privilegiado para este tránsito al origen. (shrink)

En este artículo discutimos la tesis de Jc Beall según la cual no hay negación lógica. Evaluamos la solidez del argumento con el que defiende su tesis y presentamos dos razones para rechazar una de sus premisas: que la negación tiene que ser excluyente o exhaustiva. La primera razón involucra una presentación alternativa de las reglas de la negación en sistemas de secuentes diferentes al que Beall presupone. La segunda razón establece que la negación no tiene que ser excluyente o (...) exhaustiva. (shrink)

Las estadísticas muestran que la tasa neta de escolarización en los estudios de grado en España aumenta significativamente. En esta investigación se pretende explorar la evolución de la cuenta de resultados y balance de aquellas empresas españolas de educación universitaria privada. Empleando los datos publicados en la base de datos SABI se han analizado las empresas con mayor volumen de facturación y total de activos. Como hallazgos principales se ha observado un incremento de la cifra de negocios y del resultado, (...) del orden del 40% y 20% respectivamente. No así la inversión en activos que se ha mantenido. (shrink)

Francisco J. Gonzalez - Die Idee des Guten in Platons Politeia: Beobachtungen zu den mittleren Buchern - Journal of the History of Philosophy 43:3 Journal of the History of Philosophy 43.3 354-355 Thomas A. Szlezák. Die Idee des Guten in Platons Politeia: Beobachtungen zu den mittleren Büchern. Sankt Augustin: Academia, 2003. Pp. viii + 160. Cloth, € 24,50. The first part of this book consists of a series of lectures delivered at the University of Macerata in April 2000. These (...) lectures provide a detailed and illuminating analysis of the middle books of the Republic, with the focus naturally on the three great similes. Appended to these lectures are three previously published articles on the Cave Analogy, the Idea of the Good, and Rafael Ferber's supposedly "skeptical interpretation" of Plato . While some repetition is unavoidable in such a compilation, the different parts of the book for the most part complement and.. (shrink)

Socrates can be said to have left the subsequent philosophical tradition with the problem of the relation between philosophy and politics. Already in the Republic the proposal of philosopher-kings represents more a tension than an identity. While Aristotle responds by insisting on a sharp distinction between politics and philosophical wisdom, this distinction proves on closer examination much less sharp than might appear. Heidegger characterizes philosophy as the only authentic politics and the philosopher as ruling just by virtue of being a (...) philosopher. In contrast, Foucault insists that, if philosophy can play a role in relation to politics by transforming the subject who lives politically, it plays no role within politics. In this contrast can be seen the 'fallout' of the tension bequeathed by Socrates through both Plato and Aristotle. Podría decirse que Sócrates le dejó a la tradición filosófica posterior el problema de la relación entre filosofía y política. Ya en la República la propuesta del rey filósofo representa más una tensión que una identidad. Mientras que la respuesta de Aristóteles insiste en una clara distinción entre la política y la sabiduría filosófica, un examen cuidadoso demuestra que esta distinción es menos clara de lo que parece. Heidegger caracteriza la filosofía como la única política auténtica y al filósofo como gobernante por el mero hecho de ser filósofo. En contraste, Foucault insiste en que si bien la filosofía puede desempeñar un papel en relación con la política al transformar al sujeto que vive políticamente, aquella no desempeña papel alguno dentro de la política. Este contraste ilustra el resultado de la tensión legada por Sócrates a través de Platón y Aristóteles. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Dialectic as "Philosophical Embarrassment":Heidegger's Critique of Plato's MethodFrancisco Gonzalez (bio)Philosophie ist ein Ringen um die Methode.(GA58, 228)Hans-Georg Gadamer has expressed the following debt to the thought of Martin Heidegger: "The philosophical stimuli I received from Heidegger led me more and more into the realm of dialectic, Plato's as well as Hegel's."1 It is therefore surprising to discover that Heidegger himself did not see his thought as leading him into (...) the realm of dialectic. On the contrary, in Being and Time we find a curt and unexplained dismissal of dialectic, specifically Plato's, as a "genuine philosophical embarrassment" (Verlegenheit).2 This dismissal is repeated in the Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics course of WS 1929/30 where Heidegger asserts that "all dialectic in philosophy," and thus that of Hegel as well as Plato, "is only the expression of an embarrassment."3 Only with the publication of Heidegger's earlier lecture courses from the 1920s, are we in a position to understand and evaluate this surprising dismissal. We are also in a better position to understand why even the later Heidegger failed to reassess his rejection of dialectic, despite the existence of strong incentives for doing so: incentives recognized not only by Heidegger's students but, as will be shown, by Heidegger himself. What will emerge are not only the oft-observed limitations of Heidegger as an interpreter of Plato, but also, and more importantly, their source in certain limitations of Heidegger's own thinking. [End Page 361]1. Heidegger's Critique of Dialectic in the 1920sHeidegger's most detailed account of Plato's dialectic, and thus the one that best explains his curt dismissal of dialectic in later works, is to be found in the Sophist lectures of 1924/25.4 This account begins with a description of the pervasiveness and potential obstructiveness of. Though ordinarily and most immediately pervades all forms of disclosing (GA19, 196), "[a]ccording to its original sense and original facticity, is not at all disclosing (aufdeckend), but is, if one may speak in an extreme way, precisely concealing (verdeckend)" (197).5 In other words, is initially and for the most part "idle talk" (Gerede), the kind of speech that is bandied about concerning anything whatsoever and that "has the facticity of not allowing the things themselves to be seen, but producing instead a self-satisfaction in resting content with what 'one says'" (197). Thus speech at first presents itself as self-sufficient and autonomous; one hangs onto what is said without being directed beyond it to the things themselves.This tendency of to conceal is a theme to which Heidegger returns repeatedly in the courses of the 1920s. In a course from WS 1923/24 he argues that deception has its origin in the very facticity of language.6 In the unpublished course from SS 1924 ("Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie"), the one that immediately preceded the Sophist lectures, Heidegger characterizes language as the proper domain of "Das Man" (18, 22) and describes the dominance of as leading to Gerede (7, 112).7 Heidegger therefore claims that because the Greeks lived in speech they were also imprisoned by it, with the result that a tremendous effort was needed for them to overcome their imprisonment and thus make science possible (41, 106 ).In the Sophist lectures, Heidegger assigns to dialectic an important role in this effort. Given both the pervasiveness and the concealing character of, philosophy, in its attempt to disclose the things themselves, must both begin with and break through it by means of a "speaking for and against" (Für- und Gegensprechen) that destroys the autonomy and self-sufficiency that has in Gerede and in this way "leads more and more to the matter under discussion and lets it be seen" (GA19, 197). What is needed, in short, is dia-lectic: a speaking that passes through speech.Already, however, one can see the tension that characterizes dialectic on Heidegger's account. Though dialectic is a, a speaking, it seeks to be more. Its aim is to disclose the things themselves of which it speaks, to see these things in a "pure seeing" uncontaminated by the... (shrink)

The present paper uses the theme of dialectic and dialogue to begin unraveling the similarities and differences between the hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur and H.G. Gadamer. Ricoeur is shown to distance himself from Heidegger by insisting on a dimension of explanation and distanciation (which he sometimes identifies with Plato's `descending dialectic') that cannot be reduced to, or absorbed by, understanding and appropriation. This same move, however, leads him to reject Platonic dialogue, with the attendant prioritizing of oral conversation over the (...) written text, as a model for hermeneutics. Ricoeur therefore sees in Gadamer's recourse to such a model a regression to the problematic position of Heidegger. Yet the conception of philosophy as dialectical and dialogical which Gadamer finds in Plato is capable of responding to Ricoeur's objections. Where the fundamental difference between the hermeneutics of Ricoeur and Gadamer emerges is in the question of whether experience is fundamentally dialectical and whether language is inherently dialogical. (shrink)

The present paper has a negative aim and a positive aim, both limited in the present context to a sketch or outline. The negative aim, today less controversial, is to show that Aristotle’s theory of final causality has little or nothing to do with the teleology rejected by modern science and that, therefore, far from having been rendered obsolete, it has yet to be fully understood. This aim will be met through the identification and brief discussion of some key points (...) on which Aristotle’s theory differs from teleology as still commonly understood. The positive aim is more controversial as it proposes that we take an ontology of life as the proper context for understanding the significance and nature of final causation in Aristotle. The argument for final causation, in other words, is that, without it, we would lose the phenomenon of life and, indeed, of nature altogether, reducing nature to the inanimate and mechanical. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Form and Argument in Late Plato ed. by Christopher Gill and Mary Margaret McCabeFrancisco J. GonzalezChristopher Gill and Mary Margaret McCabe, editors. Form and Argument in Late Plato. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. Pp. xi + 345. Cloth, $65.00.This collection has the commendable aim of challenging the view that in Plato’s “late” works the dialogue form is a mere formality adding little to the argumentative content, a view (...) still widespread among “analytic” scholars. The qualification is necessary because this view has already been seriously challenged by “nonanalytic” interpreters. It is therefore surprising that the editors chose contributors who almost all “share the analytic’ approach which is prominent in Anglo-American scholarship on Plato,” despite their admission that this approach has focused more on arguments than on the dialogue form (2, 299–300). Why seek to reinvent the wheel without the help of those who have already invented it? As a result, while the volume certainly makes an important contribution to our understanding of the form of this group of dialogues, it is much more successful in providing helpful and illuminating readings of their argumentative content: the detailed and rigorous analyses of McCabe, Malcolm Schofield (both on the Parmenides), and Gail Fine (on the Theaetetus) deserve special mention. The aim of the present review, which could not even begin to do justice to what the volume provides in the latter area, is therefore limited to documenting its mixed success in addressing some fundamental questions about form that have already occupied nonanalytic scholars (perhaps too exclusively):1) Does the main speaker speak for Plato?Given the great variety of main speakers in the “late” dialogues (Socrates, Parmenides, the Eleatic Stranger, Timaeus, the Athenian Stranger), each with a distinct personality and a distinct method, no attempt to understand the form of these dialogues should avoid this question. Gill raises it (293–95) and Schofield provides the most explicit response in denying that any interlocutor in a Platonic dialogue “can be assumed to be merely a spokesman for Plato’s own views” (51). More importantly, the essays by Dorothea Frede (on the Philebus) and Catherine Osborne (on the Timaeus), probably the most valuable in the volume, show what results can be achieved without this assumption. On the other hand, Michael Frede (on the Sophist) and Christopher Rowe (on the Politicus; see 158 and cf. 172 n.48) simply assume without argument that the Eleatic Stranger = Plato. All other contributors make the “spokesman” assumption, either implicitly or explicitly (see Christopher Bobonich’s reading of the Laws, 254–55).2) What is the significance of the dramatic context, especially dramatic chronology and characterization?As often noted, the Parmenides is set in Socrates’ youth and is in this sense the earliest [End Page 311] dialogue, while the series Theaetetus-Sophist-Politicus is set immediately before Socrates’ trial and condemnation. McCabe and Schofield are silent about the first fact. M. Frede briefly discusses the second (146–47), but adds little to what has already been said by others. As for the characterization of specific interlocutors, this volume overall has surprisingly little to offer. The essays of D. Frede and Osborne, however, are exemplary in this area.3) Why did Plato choose to write these works as dialogues rather than as treatises?Bobonich, D. Frede, and Osborne succeed in demonstrating the significance and even necessity of the dialogue form, an extraordinary achievement given the dialogues they discuss. Osborne in particular brilliantly shows how the dialogue form undercuts the common tendency to read the Timaeus as a treatise on natural science. Other contributors are less successful in answering this question central to the volume’s task. Schofield takes himself to be reading the Parmenides as a dialogue (51) because he, unlike Vlastos, interprets the Third Man Argument (second version) in the wider context of other arguments in the dialogue, including those of the second half. But “reading arguments in context” is demanded by any philosophical text and has nothing per se to do with the dialogue form. Fine reads the first part of the Theaetetus as the dialectical elaboration and refutation of an opponent’s view (109), but this could just as well be... (shrink)

In a critique of Heidegger that respects his path of thinking, Francisco Gonzalez looks at the ways in which Heidegger engaged with Plato’s thought over the course of his career and concludes that, owing to intrinsic requirements of Heidegger’s own philosophy, he missed an opportunity to conduct a real dialogue with Plato that would have been philosophically fruitful for us all. Examining in detail early texts of Heidegger’s reading of Plato that have only recently come to light, Gonzalez, in (...) parts 1 and 2, shows there to be certain affinities between Heidegger’s and Plato’s thought that were obscured in his 1942 essay “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth,” on which scholars have exclusively relied in interpreting what Heidegger had to say about Plato. This more nuanced reading, in turn, helps Gonzalez provide in part 3 an account of Heidegger’s later writings that highlights the ways in which Heidegger, in repudiating the kind of metaphysics he associated with Plato, took a direction away from dialectic and dialogue that left him unable to pursue those affinities that could have enriched Heidegger’s own philosophy as well as Plato’s. “A genuine dialogue with Plato,” Gonzalez argues, “would have forced [Heidegger] to go in certain directions where he did not want to go and could not go without his own thinking undergoing a radical transformation.”. (shrink)

Scientific theories are pure theoretical models integrated by a categorical scaffolding. Marx built a pure theoretical model that he called the capitalist mode of production; the historicity of its categories expresses the modes of production from which the capitalist comes and others that followed different paths. It also implies the existence of social formations in which a dominant mode of production and dominated forms of production coexist. The agrarian community is the highest form reached in the community entity and from (...) it comes the peasant economic unit generated in the parcelling of the land during the ancient form and gestation of capitalism, which is why the construction of a peasant mode of production does not proceed. (shrink)

a central thesis of martin heidegger's first reading of a Platonic dialogue, the 1924/25 course on the Sophist, was that, "for the Greeks, being means precisely to be present, to be in the present [Anwesend-sein, Gegenwärtig-sein]."1 Heidegger saw this Greek interpretation of being as leading to Plato's specific interpretation of being as eidos or idea. Heidegger makes this clear in the following passage from another Plato course, the 1931–32 course On the Essence of Truth: "'Idea' is the look [der Anblick] (...) of what something offers itself as being. These looks [Anblicke] are that in which the individual thing presents itself as this or that, that in which it is present and presencing [präsent und anwesend].... (shrink)

According to Heidegger’s own testimony, his 1940 essay, “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth,” is derived from a course he first delivered in 1931/32. Yet, while an interpretation of the Theaetetus is central to the argument in 1931/32, this dialogue is not so much as mentioned in the 1940 essay. The reason is that Heidegger’s own careful and insightful reading of the Theaetetus simply does not support his thesis regarding Plato’s “doctrine of truth.” But then the real interest of this reading is (...) that it affords the opportunity for pursuing a genuine dialogue between Heidegger and Plato that was too abruptly discontinued. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Scrivere nell'anima: verità, dialettica e persuasione in Platone; and: Oralità e scrittura in PlatoneFrancisco J. GonzalezFranco Trabattoni. Scrivere nell'anima: verità, dialettica e persuasione in Platone. Firenze: La Nouva Italia Editrice, 1994. Pp. 396. Paper, 24000 Lire.Franco Trabattoni. Oralità e scrittura in Platone. Milano: Università Degli Studi di Milano, 1999. Pp. 125. Paper, 16000 Lire.Trabattoni's masterful 1994 book, which the shorter 1999 book supplements in important ways, offers nothing (...) less than a refreshingly new and provocative interpretation of Plato's philosophy as a whole that makes it neither "conclusive-dogmatic" nor "problematic-sceptical" (7, 41-47, 161, 361-3). For Plato, on Trabattoni's account, while objective truth exists, any logos is incapable of fully expressing it and therefore refutable (158). On the other hand, dialectic can arrive at a logos sufficient (hikanos) for persuading a particular interlocutor in the context of a particular discussion (119-120), and thus for ethical and political action (330). Truth is therefore to be found onlyin dialogue (75-6, 338): that is, only where one person persuades another (249, 252, 328-9; 1999, 75). Persuasion and homologia are thus a necessary, though not sufficient condition of truth: only when capable of responding repeatedly to a wide variety of questions and objections does a persuasion deserve to be called "true" (158-9, 252, 329). This view rejects both the sophistical identification of truth with persuasion as such and the dogmatic identification of truth with universal doctrines.Because persuasion and homologia are thus essential to it, philosophy cannot be an objective science but must always be at its core a form of rhetoric (239, and thus protreptic and ad hominem, 165-6, 355, 359), which is what Trabattoni takes the Phaedrus to show (48-99). In 1999 Trabattoni brilliantly demonstrated the unity of the Phaedrus by showing how both the discussion of eros and the critique of writing are closely linked to this conception of philosophy as rhetoric (54-93). Philosophy is not, however, the kind of rhetoric that, focused on words rather than truth, fails to persuade in a way that is stable and enduring (87; 1999, 75-6).In the course of defending his "dialectical-dialogical" interpretation, Trabattoni provides an extraordinarily thorough and insightful critique of another interpretation that claims to offer a new Plato and that has become very influential in Trabattoni's native Italy: the "esotericist" interpretation, according to which fundamental questions left open by the dialogues are answered by a doctrine of principles which Plato communicated only orally. Trabattoni's 1999 book provides a very helpful account of the history and motives of the debate surrounding Plato's unwritten teachings, with regard to both their content and their significance (1-42). I see the following points of Trabattoni's critique as seriously challenging and, if unanswered, even discrediting the esotericist position: [End Page 269]1) While the esotericists interpret the critique of writing in the Phaedrus as arguing for the superiority of oral discourse as such, Trabattoni interprets it as arguing instead for the superiority of the dialogical situation in which interlocutors can be chosen and their questions and objections addressed (19-26; 1999, 83). Fixed oral doctrines would be no more dialogical than written doctrines and thus no more capable of engendering knowledge "in the soul" (63), much less of constituting this knowledge (25). What would be superior to Plato's writings, according to the Phaedrus, is a dialogue with Plato, not what Plato said orally, lifted out of its dialogical context and reported in writing by Aristotle (115; 1999, 84-5, 124). Trabattoni interprets the Seventh Letter, in his complementary accounts of 1994 and 1999, as similarly contradicting, rather than confirming, the esotericist interpretation (210-11; 1999, 116-9).2) Thomas Szlezàk has interpreted those passages where the main interlocutor deliberately leaves something out of the discussion ("Aussparungstellen") as referring to unwritten doctrines. Trabattoni argues that they are instead meant to indicate to the unknown reader, whose possible objections and questions cannot be anticipated, the possibility of proceeding further in the discussion (112-3, 182; 1999, 124). "[W]hen the dialogues are silent, they are silent always where there no... (shrink)

During the 1920s Heidegger gave no less than twelve seminars and lecture courses devoted either exclusively or in large part to the reading of Aristotle's texts. Seven of these, especially the smaller seminars for advanced students, have not been published and apparently will never be included in the Gesamtausgabe. My focus here is on the very first of these. Billed as a reading of Aristotle's De Anima, much of it was devoted to Aristotle's Metaphysics. This decision not to separate Aristotle's (...) “psychology” from his “ontology” is a key move of the seminar that anticipates the project of Being and Time. This and many other ways in which Heidegger's early reading of De Anima anticipates the key moves of the later book constitute one of the reasons for its importance. Another is that the seminar allows us to see what gets suppressed in Heidegger's reading of Aristotle, most significantly, the phenomenon of life itself in favor of an eventual focus on the being of human life or Dasein. This early seminar thus enables us not only to better understand Heidegger's project, but also to raise some fundamental questions concerning it. (shrink)

La idea de ciudadanía conlleva las nociones de derechos, pertenencia política y obligaciones cívicas. El distinto énfasis sobre cada uno de estos elementos nos remite a tradiciones histórica e intelectualmente distintas en su concepción. No obstante, el principio de la autonomía de las identidades, tal y como se reclama en numerosos países nacionalmente plurales, plantea todo un desafío a la forma en que tradicionalmente se han venido planteando las virtudes políticas de la ciudadanía, Este artículo parte de una revisión histórica (...) de las nociones liberal y republicana de la misma, analiza su relación con la idea de la nacionalidad y termina con una reflexión sobre la lealtad como virtud política y las condiciones para su posible reformulación como patriotismo federal en los Estados plurinacionales. (shrink)

A lo largo de la historia la ciudad ha constituido el espacio por excelencia de la democracia. Esta es la razón por la que reconstruyendo la cambiante funcionalidad de los espacios urbanos podemos rastrear la genealogía de la esfera pública. Este artículo aborda el estudio de las prácticas democráticas a través de los lugares de la ciudad en los que se han desarrollado, particularmente las plazas públicas. Las plazas se presentan desde esta perspectiva como un espacio agonístico añadido a las (...) instituciones formales de representación política. (shrink)

In the recently published 1924 course, Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie, Martin Heidegger offers a detailed interpretation of Aristotle's definition of kinesis in the Physics. This interpretation identifies entelecheia with what is finished and present‐at‐an‐end and energeia with being‐at‐work toward this end. In arguing against this interpretation, the present paper attempts to show that Aristotle interpreted being from the perspective of praxis rather than poiesis and therefore did not identify it with static presence. The paper also challenges later variations of Heidegger's (...) interpretation, in particular his account of dunamis in the 1931 course on Metaphysics Theta, which insists that its mode of being is presence‐at‐hand. By arguing that this reading too is untenable, the paper concludes that Aristotle's metaphysics is not a metaphysics of presence and that his texts instead point toward a possibility of metaphysics ignored by the attempts of Heidegger and others to overcome it. (shrink)

Seen from the point of view of evaluation conditions, a usual way to obtain a connexive logic is to take a well-known negation, for example, Boolean negation or de Morgan negation, and then assign special properties to the conditional to validate Aristotle’s and Boethius’ Theses. Nonetheless, another theoretical possibility is to have the extensional or the material conditional and then assign special properties to the negation to validate the theses. In this paper we examine that possibility, not sufficiently explored in (...) the connexive literature yet.We offer a characterization of connexive negation disentangled from the cancellation account of negation, a previous attempt to define connexivity on top of a distinctive negation. We also discuss an ancient view on connexive logics, according to which a valid implication is one where the negation of the consequent is incompatible with the antecedent, and discuss the role of our idea of connexive negation for this kind of view. (shrink)

On many occasions, the maximum result of a team does not equate to the total maximum individual effort of each athlete (social loafing). Athletes often combine their sports life with an academic one (Dual Career), prioritizing one over the over in a difficult balancing act. The aim of this research is to examine the existence of social loafing in a group of novice university rowers and the differences that exist according to sex, academic performance, and the kind of sport previously (...) practiced (individual or team). Therefore, a study was conducted from a probabilistic perspective using the Bayesian Network analysis methodology. The results confirm the existence of the Ringelmann effect or social loafing. The Bayesian analysis let us confirm that having a good student who practices a team sport, even in the individual rowing concept, increases the probability of obtaining greater performance (higher number of strokes and more power in each one). Therefore, when rowing partnerships are formed, the occurrence probability chain is quickly simplified, along with values of the top and bottom variables. Finally, the instantiations undertaken on the bottom variable that appears to be common in the two BNs, the watt input, enhance the results obtained. In short, rowers who have a better academic record are more involved in team testing, so this characteristic is defining when it comes to achieving better performance in team testing. (shrink)

What is often identified with Plato’s doctrine of love is greatly complicated, if not even compromised, by the dialogical form in which it is presented. In the first place, this account of love in placed in the mouth of a character, Diotima, who as priestess and woman seeking to initiate Socrates into mysteries he may not be able to follow is sharply distinguished from the philosopher. Furthermore, even the ideal portrait of the philosopher we find in the character of Socrates (...) is rendered suspect by the fanaticism and erotic idolatry of those who narrate the dialogue, Apollodorus and Aristodemus. When these narrative complications are taken into account, what emerges is a tension between the mortal knowledge of the philosopher, continually demanding to be reborn by its continual retreat into oblivion, and that secure knowledge and possession of divine reality that the philosopher can only dream of. (shrink)

The lockdown resulting from coronavirus disease 2019 has had a huge impact on peoples’ health. In sport specifically, athletes have had to deal with frustration of their objectives and changes in their usual training routines. The challenging and disruptive situation could hold implications for their well-being. This study examined the effect of the COVID-19 lockdown on changes in athletes’ reported eudaimonic well-being and goal motives over time. The relationship of resilience to changes in subjective vitality was also determined, and changes (...) in athletes’ goal motives were examined as potential mediators. Participants were 127 Spanish university athletes aged between 18 and 34 years. Approximately 4 months before the start of the lockdown in Spain, athletes responded to a questionnaire assessing their resilience, goal motives, and subjective vitality. Around 6 months later into the lockdown period, athletes’ goal motives and subjective vitality were assessed again. Growth modeling using hierarchical linear models revealed a significant decrease of autonomous goal motives and subjective vitality during the lockdown, but athletes did not show change over time in controlled goal motives. Path analysis, adjusting T2 measures for their corresponding T1 measures, showed that resilience significantly predicted changes in athletes’ autonomous goal motives, which then accounted for changes in subjective vitality. The indirect effect was significant. Resilience did not predict changes in athletes’ controlled goal motives. However, changes in controlled goal motives negatively predicted changes in subjective vitality during lockdown. The findings suggest negative impacts of the COVID-19 lockdown on athletes’ goal motives and eudaimonic well-being. Results also support the hypothesized mediational role of autonomous goal motives in the relationship between resilience and subjective vitality during the lockdown. As such, findings confirm the relevance of resilience to a key feature of athletes’ eudaimonic well-being and the importance of enhancing their autonomous goal striving. (shrink)